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Abstract
The gender gap in income and leadership positions in many domains of our society is
an undisputed pervasive phenomenon. One explanation for the disadvantaged position
of women put forward in the economic and psychology literature is the weaker response
of women to competitive incentives. Despite the large amount of literature trying to
explain this fact, the precise mechanisms behind the gender difference in competitive
responsiveness are still not fully uncovered. In this paper, we use laboratory experi-
ments to study the potential role of stereotype threat on the response of men and women
to competitive incentives in mixed-gender competition. We use a real effort math task
to induce an implicit stereotype threat against women in one treatment. In additional
treatments we, respectively, reinforce this stereotype threat and induce a stereotype
threat against men. In contrast to much of the literature we do not observe that women
are less competitive than men, neither when there is an implicit nor when there is an
explicit stereotype threat against women. We attribute this to two factors which dif-
ferentiates our experiment from previous ones. We control, first, for inter-individual
performance differences using a within-subject design, and, second, for risk differences
between non-competitive and competitive environments by making the former risky.
We do find an adverse stereotype threat effect on the performance of men when there
is an explicit stereotype threat against them. In that case any positive performance
effect of competition is nullified by the stereotype threat. Overall, our results indicate
that a stereotype threat has negative competitive performance effects only if there is
information contradicting an existing stereotype. This suggests that the appropriate in-
tervention to prevent the adverse effect of stereotype threat in performance is to avoid
any information referring to the stereotype.
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1 Introduction
The existence of a gender gap in wages and positions in the labor market is an undisputed
stylized fact. In 2018, women earned, on average, 14.8% less than men in the European
Union (Eurostat, 2020). Further, in academics for instance, only 14% of the heads of insti-
tutions in the European Union with the capacity to deliver a Ph.D. are women (Directorate–
General for Research and Innovation (European Commission), 2019). At CEO positions
among top businesses, the figures for women are even more somber.1
One common explanation for these gender differences in the workplace is discrimination
(e.g., Black & Strahan, 2001). Other explanations are women’s higher sensitivity to work-
family conflicts and women’s weaker negotiation behavior (e.g., Babcock & Laschever, 2003).
Another important explanation that emerged from the psychological and experimental eco-
nomics literature is that women are less responsive to competitive incentives. However, the
precise mechanisms behind this gender difference are still not fully known. In this paper,
we examine one such potential mechanism by studying the impact of gender stereotypes on
men’s and women’s performance under competition.2
A bulk of studies has shown that when men and women have to compete against each
other in stereotypically regarded male-dominated contexts, men generally improve their
performance under competition whereas this is not (or much less) the case for women
(e.g., Gneezy, Niederle, & Rustichini, 2003; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2004; Günther, Ekinci,
Schwieren, & Strobel, 2010; Shurchkov, 2012; Iriberri & Rey-Biel, 2017; Iriberri & Rey-
Biel, 2019).3 The psychology literature proposes ‘Stereotype Threat’ as a possible cause for
the observed gender difference (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Stereotype threat is essentially
a situational predicament where a member of a group is apprehensive by the possibility
of confirming a negative stereotype about their group. Psychology research on stereotype
threat has shown that non-competitive performance of a targeted group is harmed when
a stereotype threat is present.4 In our paper we connect the stereotype threat idea to the
gender gap under competitive incentives.
1For an overview of gender differences in the labor market, see, e.g., Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (2013).
2The body of research on gender competition also addresses the important—but distinct—question regard-
ing gender differences in self-selection into competitive environments (see, e.g., the seminal work of Niederle
& Vesterlund, 2007, more recently, Buser, Niederle, & Oosterbeek, 2014; van Dolder, van den Assem, & Buser,
2020, and in relation to stereotypes and self-selection Hernandez-Arenaz, 2020, and the references therein).
3A notable exception is Dreber, Von Essen, and Ranehill (2011) who, in an experiment with Swedish chil-
dren, do not find gender difference in competitive performance in a running task.
4For extensive reviews of the stereotype threat literature in psychology, see Inzlicht and Schmader (2012)
and Spencer, Logel, and Davies (2016).
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Specifically, we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate men’s and
women’s performance in a mathematical real-effort task. In various treatments we exam-
ine whether confirming and disconfirming , implicit and explicit, stereotypical information
affects the performance of men and women in mixed-gender competition.
To our knowledge, only two studies have hitherto studied stereotype threat in an envi-
ronment where men and women have to compete with each other. Günther et al. (2010) find
that women perform worse than men under competitive incentives for a task stereotypically
favoring men, but perform at least as well as men under competition for a gender-neutral
task and a task stereotypically favoring women. The authors suggest that women compete
less in tasks for which men are stereotypically believed to perform better than women be-
cause of stereotype threat. However, with their design they can not show that this link
actually exists.
Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2017) also find that women underperform under competition only
when a task is perceived as male-dominated. Their study offers an insightful investigation
into the effect of induced beliefs about the opponent’s actual ability on women’s competi-
tive performance. Specifically, in all their treatments, it is publicly known that competing
pairs are matched according to baseline performance (i.e., it is known to participants that
each one will compete against another one with a similar ability to perform the real-effort-
task).5 We note, that this design only captures a specific aspect of stereotype threat because
stereotypes relate to widely held beliefs regarding the comparison between two groups. In
the context of a competition, assessing the effect of stereotype threat on competitive perfor-
mance requires assessing how induced beliefs about the comparison of two specific groups
affects the competitive performance of the negatively stereotyped person against an oppo-
nent of the outgroup.
According to the psychological literature, stereotype threat experience could be either
implicitly or explicitly activated (Smith & White, 2002). Implicit activation of stereotype
threat refers to situations where simply placing the targeted individual in a context where
the associated stereotype is well known, but not explicitly highlighted, is sufficient to induce
the targeted individual to experience the threat. Explicit activation of stereotype threat
refers to situations where the targeted individual experiences the threat by explicitly con-
fronting the individual with the stereotype. Existing evidence suggests that implicitly in-
5Moreover, in the treatments where the authors aim to enhance stereotype threat against women by provid-
ing information about ability differences, they do so by informing competing pairs about the relative baseline
performance of the about-to-be opponent. In other words, the authors assess how induced beliefs about the
actual ability of the opponent affects women’s competitive performance.
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duced stereotype-based expectations may be important (Günther et al., 2010). However, in
the field, women are often (made) explicitly aware of that positions are dominated by men
or that people expect men to be more successful than women in those domains (e.g., women
competing for academic positions in math-intensive fields or aiming for top-paid corporate
positions). Therefore, we consider it as important to also study gender competition in situa-
tions where stereotype-based expectations are explicitly induced.
The most prominent effect of stereotype threat reported in the psychology literature
is that it undermines task performance of various groups across multiple domains. For
example, this effect has been shown among African-Americans (see, e.g., Steele & Aronson,
1995) and Latinos (see, e.g., Schmader & Johns, 2003) when compared to Caucasians on
tests labeled as indicators of intellectual ability. It has also been observed among women
when compared to men during tests evaluating mathematical ability (see, e.g., Spencer,
Steele, & Quinn, 1999), and among Caucasian men in math-tests when they were informed
about Asian-Americans’ superior ability in mathematics (Aronson et al., 1999). Essentially,
stereotype threat theory predicts that an existing performance gap between two groups
should be larger in a situation where one of the groups is subject to stereotype threat, in
comparison to a situation where no stereotype threat exists. Importantly, this psychology
research on stereotype threat focuses on non-competitive situations.
In a nutshell, in our experiment, we compare within-subject how men’s and women’s
performance in a math task changes from a performance stage without competition to a
performance stage with mixed-gender competition. We conduct four between-subjects treat-
ments varying the competitiveness of the second stage and the stereotype threat at the
second stage, respectively. By using a math task, but giving no additional information, we
induce an implicit stereotype threat against women in one treatment. In another treatment
we reinforce this stereotype by providing participants with truthful information about male
superiority in a subset of mathematical problems. In a third treatment, we induce a stereo-
type threat against men by informing participants truthfully of the superiority of women in
another subset of mathematical problems. In a fourth (control) treatment both performance
stages are non-competitive.
We hypothesize that there are two opposing effects regarding competitive performance
in our experiment. First, for the gender that is not the target of a stereotype threat, we
expect that competition induces participants to exert higher effort at the competitive per-
formance stage, relative to the non-competitive performance stage. Second, for the gender
that is the target of a stereotype threat, we expect that the threat counteracts the positive
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effect of competition on performance. Thus, we expect that the competitive performance of
participants depends on whether or not they are part of the target group of the stereotype
threat.
In brief, our results can be summarized as follows. First, we do not replicate the find-
ing that women’s performance is impaired in situations entailing a mathematical stereo-
type threat against women. When we induce, either implicitly or explicitly, a mathematical
stereotype threat against women, we observe that women improve performance under com-
petition as much as men do. However, we do find evidence for an adverse stereotype threat
effect on the performance of men when we induce an explicit mathematical stereotype threat
against them. Specifically, in this case men do not improve their performance under compet-
itive incentives. Moreover, we provide evidence that men’s relative underperformance is due
to both fewer attempts to solve problems and decreased accuracy when attempting to solve
a problem. This is consistent with the idea that performance is impaired by a stereotype
threat shadow.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the design
of the lab experiment followed by Section 3, where we state our hypotheses. In Section 4
we present our results, which includes hypotheses testing and an additional exploratory
analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Design of the experiment
We implement a combined between- and within-subjects design. Between-subjects, we con-
duct a baseline treatment without competition, and three treatments where participants
have to compete for a prize. Across the three competitive treatments, we vary the stereo-
type threat which we describe in detail below. Importantly, each treatment consists of two
stages. In all treatments, in the first stage, participants perform individually a real-effort
task under a non-competitive payment scheme. In the second stage, we randomly pair each
participant with a participant of the opposite gender to subsequently again perform an indi-
vidual real-effort task. In the baseline treatment, the payment scheme at the second stage
is non-competitive as at the first stage. In the three other treatments, participants perform
under a competitive payment scheme at the second stage. Our main variable of interest
is the within-subject change in performance between stages. This allows us to analyze the
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performance in the real-effort task while controlling for individual differences, including
participants’ task productivity.6
The real-effort task consists of multiplying one- and two-digit numbers and, following
Dohmen and Falk (2011), we implement five different levels of difficulty.7 The problems are
presented on computer screens and participants have to type each answer into a box and
confirm it by clicking an “OK”-button with the mouse. Each time an answer is submitted,
participants are informed whether the answer is correct. If the answer is correct, a new
problem instantaneously appears on the screen. If the answer is wrong, the same problem
has to be tackled until the correct solution is provided. This procedure helps to prevent
participants from guessing. Participants are not allowed any aid (calculator, paper and
pencil, etc.) to solve the multiplication problems.
We employ a mathematical task for the following reasons. First, to assess the potential
effects of a stereotype threat, we need a task that is stereotyped. The multiplication task is
suitable because it is well-documented that there is the stereotype that men are better at
mathematics (e.g., Spencer et al., 1999).8 Second, a crucial feature of our design is the ma-
nipulation of the stereotype threat. The multiplication task is ideal for this aspect, because
there is reliable information concerning gender differences in mathematical ability that we
can use to induce both confirming and disconfirming stereotype threats without deceiving
participants. We discuss this element in more detail below.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants are informed that it consists of two
performance stages, and that they receive specific instructions before the start of each stage.
Participants are further informed that they can earn money in each performance stage,
and that the possible earnings in the first stage are independent of their own and others’
behavior in the second stage. Also, they do not receive feedback on performance at the end
of each stage, neither in absolute terms nor relative to others.9 Next, we describe in detail
the sequence of events in the experiment.
Multiplication task practice. The experiment starts with a non-incentivized practice
task in which participants are asked to solve as many multiplication problems as possible
6Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) used this method in a field experiment in which they study gender differ-
ences in children’s performance under competition. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2017) also use a within-subject
measure of performance.
7Examples of the five levels are: 11 x 9 (level 1); 3 x 32 (level 2); 6 x 43 (level 3); 4 x 68 (level 4); 7 x 89
(level 5).
8In a separate online questionnaire, we find evidence that both men and women from our pool of partici-
pants indeed hold this stereotype. We present the results of the online questionnaire in Section 3.
9The full set of instructions used in the experiment can be found in the Web Appendix.
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within 2 minutes. This task is intended to familiarize participants with the real-effort task.
Participants are informed that it is in their best interest to gain practice because they can
earn money with the multiplication task in the performance stages.
First stage performance. In this stage, we elicit participants’ performances under non-
competitive monetary incentives. The performance in this stage serves as the baseline for
comparison with the performance in the subsequent competitive second stage. Before par-
ticipants start with the multiplication task, they are informed that they have been ran-
domly paired with another participant present in the lab, without making any reference
to gender. Participants perform the multiplication task for 5 minutes under a random pay
incentive scheme. Specifically, participants are informed that at the end of the experiment
one participant in each pair will be chosen with equal probability to be paid out. If cho-
sen, a participant earns C0.40 for each correctly solved multiplication problem, otherwise
the participant earns nothing. We implement random payment in the non-competitive en-
vironment to control for the element of risk, which is inevitably present in the competitive
environments.10
Confidence level elicitation. Immediately after the first stage, we ask each participant to
estimate their relative performance compared to four randomly chosen participants present
in the lab. Specifically, participants are asked to indicate their best estimates (in percentage)
that exactly 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 of the randomly chosen other participants correctly answered
more problems in the first stage. We monetarily incentivize this belief elicitation using a
quadratic scoring rule (Offerman, 1997) (for details, see the Web Appendix).
Second stage performance. In this stage, we distinguish four environments: a non-
competitive (control) environment and three environments with the same competitive in-
centives. In each competitive environment, we randomly form mixed-gender pairs where
men and women compete with each other, and make participants aware of it by mentioning
in the instructions that they are paired with an opposite gender participant. Subsequently,
participants perform the multiplication task for 5 minutes under a winner-takes-all tour-
nament incentive scheme. That is, in each pair, the participant who correctly solves more
multiplication problems earns C0.40 for each solved multiplication. The other earns noth-
ing. In case of a tie, both participants earn C0.20 for each correctly solved multiplication.
All participants face the same sequence of multiplication problems.
10If a standard piece-rate were used as the non-competitive payment scheme, gender differences in attitude
towards risk (Croson & Gneezy, 2009) may obscure the pure competition effect on performance.
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Next we describe how we induced different stereotype threats which constitutes our
main treatment variable and which is the only dimension in which the three competitive
environments differ.
Implicit Stereotype Threat Against Women (IST-W). In this treatment, we merely pro-
vide the instructions for the multiplication task. According to the idea of an implicit activa-
tion of stereotype threat (e.g., Smith & White, 2002), the use of a mathematical task in our
experimental setting should be a sufficient situational clue to induce women to experience
stereotype threat because the known mixed-gender pair formation makes gender salient,
i.e., it makes women aware that they have to compete with a men.
Explicit Stereotype Threat Against Women (EST-W). In this treatment, we reinforce the
stereotype threat against women by explicitly inducing a negative stereotype about women’s
ability to perform a mathematical task. Just before starting to compete, each participant
unexpectedly faces the following information during 40 seconds:
“Before starting the multiplication task in this stage, please read carefully the following in-
formation:
In order to assess the magnitude of gender differences in mathematics performance, three
leading researchers, J. Hyde, E. Fennema and J. Lamon, performed an evaluation of 100
studies in this field. In their paper, we can read the following: “refined discussions generally
conclude that the overall differences in mathematics performance (. . . ) appear in adolescence
and usually favor boys in tasks involving problem solving.”
In “Gender Differences in Mathematics Performance: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bul-
letin.
If you wish, you can inspect this paper after the experiment.”
Explicit Stereotype Threat Against Men (EST-M). In this treatment, we contradict the
stereotype that men are better at mathematics by explicitly inducing a negative stereotype
about men’s ability to perform a mathematical task. Just before starting to compete, each
participant unexpectedly faces the following information during 40 seconds:
“Before starting the multiplication task in this stage, please read carefully the following in-
formation:
In order to assess the magnitude of gender differences in mathematics performance, three
leading researchers, J. Hyde, E. Fennema and J. Lamon, performed an evaluation of 100
studies in this field. In their paper, we can read the following: “refined discussions generally
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conclude that the overall differences in mathematics performance (. . . ) appear in adolescence
and usually favor girls in tasks of computation.”
In “Gender Differences in Mathematics Performance: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bul-
letin.
If you wish, you can inspect this paper after the experiment.”
We note that the quotes are not perfectly symmetric because we needed to avoid de-
ceiving participants. With these quotes, extracted from Hyde, Fennema, and Lamon (1990)
(p. 140), we use truthful information that allows us to implement the desired manipulations
while still minimizing text asymmetry.
Finally, we conduct a control treatment to assess whether there are any significant learn-
ing or fatigue effects during the performance of the multiplication task.
Twice Random Pay (TRP). In the second stage of this treatment, participants perform
the multiplication task for 5 minutes under the random pay incentive scheme, as in the first
stage.
In each treatment, after the end of the second performance stage, we elicit participants’
attitudes towards risk and competition.
Risk attitude elicitation. We elicit each participant’s response to the Dohmen et al. (2011)
general risk question: “How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully
prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale,
in which the value 0 means ‘not at all willing to take risks’ and the value 10 means ‘very
willing to take risks’.”11
Competitive attitude elicitation. We elicit each participant’s response to the Machiavelli
personality test, also known as the Mach IV test, in which high scores reliably predict com-
petitive behavior (Christie & Geis, 2013) (for details, see the Web Appendix).
2.1 Experimental procedure
Participants in the experiment were recruited from the participants pool of the Behav-
ioral and Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEELab) at Maastricht University, using
the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2015). The experiment was fully computerized using the
z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the BEELab. We conducted eight ses-
sions (two sessions with each of the four treatments). In total, 192 participants took part in
11In a paid field experiment, Dohmen et al. (2011) show that responses to this question reliably predict
incentivized lottery choices.
8
the experiment (40, 46, 50 and 56 in the IST-W, EST-W, EST-M, and TRP, respectively). By
design, an equal number of men and women participated in each session.12 The participants
were mostly students of business and economics at Maastricht University with an average
age of 22.13 Each session lasted around 90 minutes and average earnings were C16.30. All
decisions and payments were treated confidentially.
3 Hypotheses
Our main variable of interest is the change in performance from the non-competitive first
stage to the (non-)competitive second stage. Table 1 summarizes the incentives and stereo-
type threat present in each stage for each treatment.
Table 1. Payment incentive and stereotype threat per stage
1st stage 2nd stage
Treatment Incentive Stereotype Threat Incentive Stereotype Threat
IST-W Random Pay None Competition Implicit Against Women
EST-W Random Pay None Competition Explicit Against Women
EST-M Random Pay None Competition Explicit Against Men
TRP Random Pay None Random Pay None
Note: IST-W ... Implicit Stereotype Threat Against Women; EST-W ... Explicit Stereotype Threat
Against Women; EST-M ... Explicit Stereotype Threat Against Men; TRP ... Twice Random Pay.
The control treatment consists of two identical stages in which participants perform un-
der a non-competitive payment scheme. Based on Dohmen and Falk (2011), we do not expect
any significant learning or fatigue effects during the performance of the multiplication task.
Hypothesis 1. In treatment TRP, both men’s and women’s change in performance between
stages is not significant.
Previous research has shown that competitive incentives generally increase performance
relative to a non-competitive environment (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003). Therefore, we expect
that the winner-takes-all tournament payment scheme in the three treatments with compe-
tition will lead to an increase of participants’ performance, especially for those who are not
12See the Web Appendix for the procedure to ensure a perfectly balanced gender composition in each session.
1386% of the participants were business and economics students. The remaining participants had a back-
ground in psychology, law, arts and culture, health sciences, European studies, or philosophy. Demographics
such as age, field of study, and nationality do not differ in the four treatments.
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the target of a stereotype threat in the second stage. Note that this is the case for men in
both treatments with a stereotype threat against women (IST-W and EST-W) and for women
in the treatment with a stereotype threat against men (EST-M).
Hypothesis 2. In IST-W and EST-W, for men there is a significant increase in performance
from the first to second stage. For women this is the case in EST-M.
Stereotype threat theory states that the performance of individuals belonging to a stereo-
typed target group is harmed relatively to a situation entailing no stereotype threat (e.g.,
Steele & Aronson, 1995). Therefore, the adverse effect of a stereotype threat should coun-
teract the expected positive effect of the competitive incentives on performance for women
in the IST-W and EST-W treatments, and for men in the EST-M treatment. However, before
we can state our hypotheses regarding men and women in these treatments, we need to (i)
verify that men and women from our participant pool do indeed hold the stereotype that
men are better at mathematics, and (ii) measure if and how men and women from our par-
ticipant pool update their belief about men’s and women’s mathematics performance after
having read the quotes we use to explicitly induce stereotype threats.
For this purpose, we conducted a separate incentivized online experiment with respon-
dents who did not participate in the main experiment but are recruited from the same partic-
ipant pool.14 In the first part of the online experiment, respondents’ receive an explanation
of the non-competitive first stage of the main experiment. Given this information, they are
asked to estimate the average number of correct answers by respectively male and female
participants during that stage in the main experiment. This provides us with information
about their potential stereotyped beliefs. The second part of the online experiment is split
into two versions. Half of the male and female respondents read the quote that we use in
the main experiment to explicitly induce a stereotype threat against women, whereas the
remaining half of male and female respondents read the quote that we use in the main
experiment to explicitly induce a stereotype threat against men. Subsequently, in both ver-
sions, respondents are asked whether they want to change their initial estimates. This
provides us with information about the effectiveness of our explicit stereotype induction.15
14The participants in the online experiment do not differ significantly form the lab participants in terms of
age, nationality, and field of study (see the Web Appendix).
15Respondents are rewarded for the accuracy of their estimates. See the Web Appendix for the full instruc-
tions, which provide the details of the monetary incentives.
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Table 2. Online experiment – Average estimate of the gender gap in performance
Version EST-W (n= 60) Version EST-M (n= 60)
Before info After EST-W info Before info After EST-M info
Male respondents
2.2∗∗ 5.8∗∗∗ 1.9∗∗ −2.1∗∗∗
(6.4) (5.2) (5.8) (4.5)
Female respondents
2.8∗∗ 4.9∗∗∗ 2.7∗∗∗ −1.4∗
(6.7) (6.4) (4.7) (4.3)
Note: A respondent’s estimate of the gender gap in performance equals the respondent’s estimate
of correct answers of men minus a respondent’s estimate of correct answers of women. EST-W
(EST-M) refers to the piece of information to explicitly induce a stereotype threat against women
(men). The “Before info” part of the questionnaire is the same in both versions. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, based on Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests for
the null hypothesis of no gender gap in performance. Standard deviation in parentheses.
In Table 2, we report male and female respondents’ estimate of the gender gap in per-
formance of participants in the main experiment, where the gender gap is defined as a
respondent’s estimate of correct answers of men minus a respondent’s estimate of correct
answers of women. Before receiving the stereotyping piece of information (columns ‘Before
info’), both male and female respondents believe that men perform the multiplication task
significantly better than women. That is, these data are consistent with men and women
from our participant pool holding the stereotype that men are better at mathematics. This
gap is significantly different from zero for both male and female respondents, also after hav-
ing read the quote that women may indeed be worse in mathematics (column ‘After EST-W
info’). Thus, we can assume that women in our main experiment face a stereotype threat in
the implicit as well as explicit stereotype threat treatment, which leads to our next hypoth-
esis.16
Hypothesis 3. In IST-W and EST-W, the increase in performance of women between stages
is significantly smaller than men’s increase in performance.
Moreover, after having seen the quote stating that women are indeed worse than men in
mathematics, female respondents’ estimated performance gap is even increased relative to
the initial stereotyped beliefs.17 Thus, we conclude that the explicit induction of a stereotype
threat against women in EST-W worked as intended and we formulate our next hypothesis.
16The hypotheses we present here are also consistent with the model of self-stereotyping proposed by
Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2014).
17Female respondents: 2.8 vs. 4.9, p = 0.0017, Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Our manipulation also worked for
men (2.2. vs. 5.8, p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank test), but we do not have an a priori hypothesis regarding
men’s belief updating.
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Hypothesis 4. For women, the increase in performance between stages is in EST-W signifi-
cantly smaller than in IST-W.
Finally, we see in Table 2 that male (and female) respondents reverse their initial be-
lief in a gender gap in performance after having seen the quote stating that men are worse
than women in mathematics (column ‘After EST-M info’). Thus, in EST-M we explicitly in-
duce a stereotype threat against men as intended.18 This leads to our hypothesis regarding
behavior in the EST-M treatment.
Hypothesis 5. In EST-M, the increase in performance between stages of men is significantly
smaller than the one of women.
4 Results
In this section, we first report results regarding gender difference in performance in the
non-competitive first stage, followed by results related to our hypotheses. Thereafter, we
present a robustness check when controlling for attitudes towards risk and competition.
Throughout this section, we use either Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) tests or Mann-Whitney
(MW) tests to investigate differences in distributions. All tests are two-sided.19
Figure 1 depicts the cumulative distributions of the number of correct answers during
the non-competitive first stage performance pooled across treatments, separately for women
and men. The figure shows that the men’s performance distribution statistically dominates
women’s performance distribution, i.e., men perform significantly better than women.20
Importantly, the figure also indicates a large inter-individual heterogeneity in perfor-
mance suggesting that it is important to control for baseline performance, as we do, when
investigating the effect of competition on performance in the second stage.
18Male respondents (Female respondents): 1.9 vs. -2.1 (2.7 vs. -1.4), p < 0.001 in both cases, Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests.
19We report two-sided tests for all comparisons. For those comparisons where we have a directional hypoth-
esis, the reported tests regarding insignificance are not different when using a one-sided test.
20The pooled results for men’s and women’s average number of correct answers in the first stage are: 28.3
(men) vs. 23.2 (women), p < 0.001, MW test, n = 190. We exclude two male participants who participated in
treatment EST-W and TRP, respectively, and are clear outliers in terms of performance. These are the only
participants who, in both stages, solved all problems available (70) before time elapsed. The results we present
are qualitatively the same if we include those two participants.
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Figure 1. Performance in non-competitive first stage - Women and Men
(Cumulative distributions pooled across all treatments)
4.1 Hypotheses testing
To analyze how men and women respond to competitive incentives in a mixed-gender com-
petition, we make two types of comparisons. First, we compare both men’s and women’s
performance in the non-competitive stage to their performance in the competitive stage.
Second, to evaluate possible gender differences in the response to competition, we perform
a difference in difference analysis, comparing men’s change in performance between stages
to women’s change in performance.
Table 3 summarizes the performance (i.e, the number of correctly solved multiplications)
of women and men in each treatment and also reports the change in performance from the
first to the second stage for women and men, within each treatment. In addition, Figure 2
depicts the cumulative distributions in performance change separately for men and women,
also in each treatment. In the following, we focus on our main variables of interest which
are the change in performance from stage 1 to stage 2 and how this change differs between
genders.
We first analyze behavior in the Twice Random Pay (TRP) treatment, which also informs
us about whether we have to take into account learning or fatigue effects. In this treatment,
men increase their performance by +0.3 correct answers and women decrease it by −0.9
correct answers. None of these differences is significant (women: p = 0.515, men: p = 0.819,
WSR tests).21 We summarize this observation in our first result.
21In addition, we find for both genders a substantial overlap between the cumulative distributions of the
first and second stage performance (see the Web Appendix).
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Table 3. Performance in non-competitive and competitive stages
TRP IST-W EST-W EST-M
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
No competition 25.7 30.4 21.8 23.9 23.7 30.8 21.3 27.2
(11.58) (10.35) (10.79) (11.54) (9.71) (10.10) (8.84) (9.45)
Competition 24.8 30.7 26.2 28.0 26.7 35.4 23.6 25.6
(15.33) (10.13) (11.25) (13.23) (11.12) (12.97) (11.38) (10.33)
Change -0.9 +0.3 +4.4 +4.1 +3.0 +4.6 +2.3 -1.6
p-value 0.515 0.819 0.019 0.012 0.044 0.004 0.090 0.269
Note: TRP ... Twice Random Pay; IST-W ... Implicit Stereotype Against Women; EST-W ... Explicit Stereotype
Against Women; EST-M ... Explicit Stereotype Against Men. Numbers indicate average number of correct
answers, standard deviations in parentheses. Change equals performance in competitive second stage minus
non-competitive first stage, p-values are based on Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.
Result 1. In the Twice Random Pay treatment, men’s and women’s change in performance
between stages is not significant.
This result supports our first hypothesis and shows that there is neither a fatigue nor
an experience effect for both genders. For completeness, we also note that the change in
performance does not differ between women and men (p = 0.582, MW test; see also Figure
2a). Therefore, it is safe to assume that repetition does not effect the performance of our
participants.
Hypothesis 2 states that when there is no stereotype threat then both men and women
increase their performance from the non-competitive to the competitive stage. Men do not
face a stereotype threat in the treatments IST-W and EST-W and Table 3 shows that in
both treatments men’s performance indeed increases significantly. For women, there is no
stereotype threat in EST-M and their performance is increased in this treatment, albeit
only at the 9% significance level. Thus, our second hypothesis is largely supported and we
summarize in our next result.
Result 2. When there is no stereotype threat, both men and women increase their perfor-
mance (marginally) significantly from the non-competitive to the competitive stage.
Next we analyze if Hypothesis 3 is supported which refers to a comparison of the change
in performance of men and women between stages. Specifically, it states that whenever
there is an implicit or explicit stereotype threat against women, then their increase in per-
formance (if any) is smaller than the increase in performance of men. Figures 2b and 2c de-
pict the cumulative distributions of performance changes of men and women in both treat-
ments with a stereotype threat against women (IST-W and EST-W). For both treatments,
the distributions show a significant overlap, suggesting that there is no difference in per-
formance change between men and women. This impression is corroborated by statistical
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(a) Twice Random Pay
(TRP)
(b) Implicit Stereotype against Women
(IST-W)
(c) Explicit Stereotype against Women
(EST-W)
(d) Explicit Stereotype against Men
(EST-M)
Figure 2. Performance change between first and second stage – Women and Men
(Cumulative distributions separate by treatments)
tests. In both treatments the changes in performance of men and women are indistinguish-
able (IST-W, p = 0.968; EST-W, p = 0.510; MW tests). Thus our third hypothesis is not
supported and we summarize this finding in the following result.
Result 3. When there is a stereotype threat against women, there is no difference between
men an women in the change of performance between stages.
Importantly, the reason that there is no difference between men and women is that the
latter, just as men, significantly increase their performance from the non-competitive to the
competitive stage. This can be seen from Table 3 which reports a significant performance
increase of women in both treatments with a stereotype threat against women (IST-W: p =
0.019, EST-W: p = 0.044; WSR tests). We summarize these observations in our next result.
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Result 4. Women significantly increase their performance between stages even if there is
stereotype threat against women.
Note that the last two results are in contrast to a number of studies showing that women
do not increase their performance in response to competitive incentives or do so less strongly
than me do.
The final hypotheses regarding women behavior compares their change in performance
from the non-competitive to the competitive stage when faced with an implicit versus an
explicit stereotype threat (Hypothesis 4). Figure 3 shows the cumulative distributions of
women’s performance changes between stages for both treatments. There is a considerable
overlap of the distributions suggesting that there is no difference, which is corroborated by
a statistical test (p = 0.600, MW test). Thus, we do not find support for Hypothesis 4.
Figure 3. Change in performance from non-competitive to competitive stage - Women only
(Cumulative distributions for IST-W and EST-W)
Result 5. Women’s change in performance between stages is not significantly different in the
Implicit and Explicit Stereotype Threat treatments.
Our last hypothesis compares the performance change of men and women between stages
in the treatment with an explicit stereotype threat against men. Figure 2d shows the cu-
mulative distributions of these changes for men and women. We see that men’s distribution
consistently lies above women’s distribution pointing at a difference between genders. A
MW test returns that the difference is significant at p = 0.066. Thus our Hypothesis 5
receives marginal statistical support. Interestingly, the difference in performance change
when there is an explicit stereotype threat against men has two sources. First, in contrast
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to all other competition treatments, men do not increase their performance from the non-
competitive to the competitive stage; in fact, their performance at the competitive stage is
insignificantly worse than at the non-competitive stage (see Table 3, EST-M: Men). Second,
women marginally significantly increase their performance between stages (see Table 3,
EST-M: Women).
Result 6. When there is an explicit stereotype threat against men, women increase their
performance marginally significantly more than men do. This holds because men do not
increase their performance, whereas women do increase it.
In a nutshell, we find supportive evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 2 and, at the marginal
significance level, also for Hypotheses 5. In contrast, Hypotheses 3 and 4 are rejected. The
reason why we do not find support for the latter two hypotheses is because women respond
significantly positive to competitive incentives despite an implicit or even explicit stereotype
threat against them. This is in contrast to what could be expected given the published
literature on how women respond to competitive incentives.
We next discuss if the presented results are robust when controlling for some individ-
ual characteristics that are arguably important in environments with competitive incen-
tives. An important feature of the competitive stage is that the payment participants re-
ceive depends not only on their own performance but also on the performance of another
participant. Therefore, gender differences in confidence levels regarding their relative per-
formance might affect behavior under competition. Moreover, possible gender differences
in risk attitude (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009) and competitive attitude might also cause
gender differences in performance, especially at the competitive stage.
Recall that we elicited confidence levels by asking participants to rank their performance
in the first stage by indicating the likelihood that 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 of four other randomly
chosen participants performed better at this stage. We find a clear gender difference in
confidence levels. Specifically, 19.6% of men believe that none of the other four participants
were performing better, whereas for women this the case only for 8.7%. Equivalently, 21.3%
of women believe that they performed worse than all four members of the comparison group,
but for men this number amounts to only 7.7%. These gender difference in confidence levels
is statistically significant. Moreover, using the risk questionnaire from Dohmen et al. (2011)
and a competition attitude measure based on the Mach-IV test, we also find that women are
significantly less risk tolerant and less competitive than men.22
22For a detailed discussion of the results regarding confidence, risk attitude, and competitive attitude, see
the Web Appendix.
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To determine if and how these factors jointly affect the change in performance between
stages, and evaluate whether the treatment effects on men’s and women’s competitive per-
formance are robust to controlling for these factors, we run regression analyses, which are
reported in Table 4. In specifications (1) and (2) the Twice Random Pay treatment is the
omitted category, in specification (3) the omitted category are men in the Twice Random Pay
treatment, and in specification (4), which looks at women’s performance only, it is the IST-W
treatment. The variables IST-W, EST-W, and EST-M are dummy variables representing
the three competition treatments. Women is a dummy variable taking on value 1 when the
participant is female and the variables Women × IST-W (EST-W) [EST-M] interact female
participants with each of the competition treatments. Per-non-comp is a continuous variable
that controls for performance at the non-competitive first stage and Confidence, Risk, and
Competitive are continuous control variables for the respective individual characteristics
discussed above.23
Specifications (1) and (2) separately investigate the behavior of men and women, respec-
tively. The coefficient estimates show that the (in)significant results regarding men’s and
women’s behavior that we identified above are robust. The same holds when we directly
compare men’s to women’s response to competition—see the (in)significant interaction terms
in specification (3)—and when we directly compare women’s competitive response in the
EST-W treatment to their response in the IST-W treatment (see the insignificant coefficient
of EST-W in regression (4)). These observations lead to our next result.
Result 7. The treatment effects regarding the change in performance between stages are
robust when controlling for confidence level, risk attitude, and competitive attitude.
4.2 Is there a stereotype threat shadow? A robustness check
Overall, the results we obtained are not in line with stereotype threat theory, except for
the treatment with an explicit stereotype threat against men. As a robustness check, we
look at the data from a different angle, namely by contrasting gaps in performance between
groups. The idea is to compare the performance of two groups engaging in the same task
in different situations. In one situation, no group faces a stereotype threat and, in another
situation, one group is negatively stereotyped whereas the other group is not. Stereotype
23Confidence can take on values 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 with lower numbers indicating higher confidence, Risk can
take on integer values from 0 to 10 with higher numbers indicating higher risk tolerance, and Competitive can
take on integer values ranging from 20 to 140 with higher scores indicating stronger competitive attitudes.
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Table 4. Linear regression model of change in performance between stages
Dependent variable: change in performance between stages
Men Women Pooled Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IST-W 2.930∗ 5.462∗∗∗ 3.668∗∗ base group
[1.887] [2.064] [1.857]
EST-W 4.302∗∗ 4.051∗∗ 4.461∗∗ -0.780
[1.885] [2.067] [1.861] [2.001]




Women × IST-W 1.959
[2.699]
Woman × EST-W -0.085
[2.693]
Woman × EST-M 4.964∗
[2.706]
Perf-non-comp -0.064 0.107 0.263 -0.020
[0.088] [0.061] [0.051] [0.113]
Confidence -0.550 1.476∗ 0.662 1.539
[1.102] [0.757] [0.610] [1.159]
Risk 0.749∗∗ 0.158 0.470∗ 0.704
[0.301] [0.376] [0.239] [0.471]
Competitive 0.089∗ 0.103 0.093∗∗ 0.010
[0.050] [0.073] [0.046] [0.099]
Intercept 3.29 0.400 1.084 7.161
[4.627] [8.008] [4.293] [10.551]
Other controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 94 96 190 43
R2 0.246 0.157 0.173 0.130
Note: The continuous variables are demeaned for better interpretation of the coefficient
values (e.g., Non-competitive performancei = actual non-competitive performancei - sample
mean of non-competitive performance). Other controls include age, nationality, and field of
study. ***,** , and * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors in
brackets.
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threat theory would predict that under such circumstances the difference in performance
between the two groups differs between the two situations because the performance of the
stereotyped group is harmed in the situation entailing a stereotype threat.
In the non-competitive stage, at which neither men nor women are exposed to a stereo-
type threat, we observe that the gender gap in performance favors men in each treatment.
Stereotype threat theory would predict that the gender gap in performance (i) increases in
the second stage of the IST-W and EST-W treatments, (ii) decreases in the second stage of
the EST-M treatment, and (iii) stays the same at the second stage of the TRP treatment. To
test these predictions, we compare in each treatment the gender gap in performance in the
second stage to the gender gap in performance in the first stage.
Figure 4 displays the average gender gap in performance at each stage, separately for
each treatment.24 The figure clearly shows that in the TRP treatment, with no stereotype
threat at both stages, and in both treatments with a stereotype threat against women at
the second stage (IST-W and EST-W), the difference of the gender gaps between stages are
small and insignificant (TRP: p = 0.580, IST-W: p = 0.970, EST-W: p = 0.603; WSR tests).25
In contrast, in the EST-M treatment, with an explicit stereotype threat against men, the
average gap in performance between genders is substantially reduced in the second stage,
and the reduction is significant at p = 0.082 (first stage vs. second stage: 6 vs. 2). We
summarize these observations in our next result.
Result 8. When there is a stereotype threat against women, the observed change in the gender
performance gap between the non-competitive and competitive stage is not consistent with
explanations based on stereotype threat theory, but it is consistent with it when there is an
explicit stereotype threat against men.
Overall, our results do not support the common finding that women’s performance is
impaired in situations entailing a mathematical stereotype threat against women. How-
ever, we do find evidence for the adverse effect of a stereotype threat on performance of
men when we explicitly induce a stereotype threat against men. The relative worsening of
men’s performance in our setting when informed about women’s superior ability in mathe-
24The average gender gap in performance at the second stage equals
∑n
i=1(2
ndstage performance malei −
2ndstage performance femalei)
1
n , in which n is the total number of pairs that are formed for the com-
petition in the second stage. The average gender gap in performance at the first stage equals∑n
i=1(1
ststage performance malei −1ststage performance femalei) 1n , using the pairs that are formed for the sec-
ond stage. To compute the gender gaps in the TRP treatment, we use in both stages the pairs that we form to
determine who gets paid in the second stage.
25The average gender gaps at stage 1 and stage 2 are: TRP: 4.9 vs. 6, IST-W: 2.1 vs. 1.8, EST-W: 7.5 vs. 8.5.
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Figure 4. Gender gap in performance at each stage
matics is significant, even though men are not considered to be a group that is prone to a
mathematical stereotype threat.26
4.3 Attempts and accuracy
Changes in performance between stages may be due to two non-exclusive reasons. It could
be that participants make fewer attempts to solve the multiplication problems or that they
make more errors, that is, that their accuracy rate of attempts decreases. In this section,
we provide an exploratory analysis of these possibilities.
Table 5 reports participants’ average number of attempts to solve problems and their
accuracy rate, defined as the number of correct answers over the number of attempts, in
both stages. For both measures, the table also shows the difference between stages and
whether these differences are significant. In the TRP treatment, as one would expect, nei-
ther men’s nor women’s number of attempts and accuracy rate differ significantly between
26According to stereotype threat theory, the worsening of performance should be especially observed if the
targeted group is prone to the stereotype threat. However, proneness is not a necessary condition to experience
stereotype threat. For instance, Aronson et al. (1999) find that Caucasian men perform worse in math-tests
when informed about male Asian-Americans’ superior ability in mathematics.
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Table 5. Attempts and accuracy rate
Average number of attempts Average accuracy rate
1st stage 2nd stage Difference 1st stage 2nd stage Difference
TRP
Women 31.35 31.65 0.30 0.851 0.821 -0.030
Men 36.44 37.07 0.63 0.817 0.822 0.004
IST-W
Women 28.55 33.05 4.5∗∗∗ 0.737 0.779 0.042
Men 29.4 32.95 3.55∗∗∗ 0.802 0.841 0.039
EST-W
Women 29.35 32.13 2.78∗∗∗ 0.795 0.823 0.028
Men 35.86 41.55 5.69∗∗∗ 0.848 0.836 -0.012
EST-M
Women 26.76 29.64 2.88∗∗∗ 0.752 0.758 0.006
Men 31.72 31.80 0.08 0.850 0.785 −0.065∗∗∗
Note: A participant’s accuracy rate equals the number of correct answers divided by the number of attempts to
solve problems. We do not include two female participants in the Twice Random Pay treatment because they
did not attempt any question in the second stage (we interpret their behavior as indicative of boredom). ***
and ** significant at 1% and 5%, respectively, derived from Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
stages. In contrast, in both treatments with a competitive second stage and a stereotype
threat against women (IST-W and EST-W) both men and women significantly increase their
number of attempts without jeopardizing their accuracy of answers, as the latter does not
change significantly. Interestingly, the pattern is very different in the treatment where we
induce a stereotype threat against men (EST-M). There, women significantly increase their
number of attempts from the first to the second stage, whereas men do not. In addition, the
accuracy of answers is unchanged for women but decreases significantly for men.
Result 9. When there is competition in the second stage, women increase their number of
attempts without a change in the accuracy rate, irrespective of the stereotype threat. In con-
trast, when there is a stereotype threat against men, men do not increase their number of
attempts and exhibit a decrease in the accuracy of answers.
The distinct behavior of men in the EST-M treatment invites further scrutiny. In what
follows, we shed some more light on the performance of men in this treatment. Specifically,
we examine men’s change in performance between stages broken down into three periods
of 100 seconds to test whether the poorer performance of men persists over the whole 5
minutes of competition.
Table 6 reports men’s change in the number of attempts and accuracy rates between
stages for those three periods, separately for the treatments where they face no stereotype
threat (IST-W & EST-W) and for the treatment where they do face one (EST-M). The table
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also shows the difference in changes between treatments and whether these differences are
significant. We observe that in IST-W & EST-W the number of attempts to solve problems
increases between stages in all three periods, whereas in EST-M it decreases in the first
two periods and is weaker in the third period. A comparison of changes between treatments
show that these differences are statistically significant in the first two periods. Similarly, in
IST-W & EST-W the accuracy rate is increasing between stages in all three periods, whereas
in EST-M it decreases over the whole duration of the performance. Between treatments the
changes are statistically significant in the first period. We summarize these observations in
our last result.
Table 6. Men’s change in attempts and accuracy between stages
Change in number of attempts Change in accuracy rate
between stages between stages
0–100 101–200 201-300 0–100 101–200 201–300
EST-M -0.88 -0.56 1.52 -0.148 -0.036 -0.040
IST-W & EST-W 0.64 1.55 2.48 0.027 0.028 0.029
Difference −1.52∗∗ −2.11∗∗∗ -0.96 −0.175∗∗∗ -0.064 -0.069
Note: 0–100, 101-200, 201-300, respectively, refer to the initial, middle, and final 100 seconds of the 5 minutes
performance. We pool IST-W and EST-W because men’s change in the number of attempts between stages is
not significantly different across periods in these treatments. The same holds for the change in the accuracy
rate between stages. *** and ** significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively, based on Mann-Whitney tests.
Result 10. In comparison to situations without a stereotype threat against men, when there
is an explicit stereotype threat, men’s performance in solving problems is lower because they
tend to make fewer attempts and have a decreased accuracy rate. These differences are espe-
cially pronounced at the beginning of the task.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we assess the effect of stereotype threats on the competitive performance of
men and women. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental study in economics to
investigate not only stereotype threats against women but also against men. Specifically,
we conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the hypothesis that stereotype threats
against men and women, respectively, harm their performance in mixed-gender competition.
For women, our results do not corroborate the psychology research on stereotype threat.
According to this literature, we should expect an increased gender gap in performance in
situations where the threat exists compared to a situation where this is not the case. In
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contrast, in our experiment women’s performance under competition appears not to be ham-
pered, neither by an implicit nor an explicit stereotype threat. Interestingly, however, when
inducing an explicit stereotype threat against men, we do see an adverse effect on the per-
formance of men.
Our main interest was to examine if stereotype threat impedes performance under com-
petitive incentives. The latter element may explain why our results for women differ from
the psychology literature because it studies mathematical stereotype threats against women
exclusively in non-competitive situations. Consistent with this interpretation, we do ob-
serve that women perform worse than men in our non-competitive task, when assuming
an implicit stereotype threat against women at this stage. However, we are doubting that
this interpretation would survive scrutiny because it appears unlikely that a gender-based
stereotype threat has an effect in a non-competitive environment, but does not have an ef-
fect in a competitive environment where it is known to women that they are competing with
men. Another possible reason why we do not observe an adverse effect of stereotype threat
on women’s performance in our study is that we use monetary incentives. This element
might wipe out the negative effect of stereotype threat identified in psychology research.27
We do not find that women respond less strongly than men to competitive incentives,
which contrasts existing results in the economics literature indicating that men respond
more strongly to competitive incentives than women do (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2003). In our
three competitive environments, we observe in two treatments that men and women react
similarly to competitive incentives, and in a third treatment women even react stronger
than men do. One possible explanation for this diverging result relates to the observed large
inter-individual heterogeneity in (baseline) performance. Most other studies use between-
subjects designs which make it impossible to control for performance heterogeneity at the
individual level. Our within-subjects design takes care of this and it may be one reason why
we do note see a gender difference in response to competition.
Another possible explanation for the contrasting results is that we control to a larger
extent for the risk involved in competition than other studies do. In previous studies, com-
petitive incentives are commonly compared to risk-free piece-rate incentives. However, tour-
nament incentives clearly also include a risk component. Thus, it is likely that part of the
gender difference in response to competition is due to the well-documented difference in
risk attitudes between men and women (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009).28 To control for this,
27Using monetary incentive in a non-competitive situation, Fryer, Levitt, and List (2008) did not find evi-
dence for the negative impact of stereotype threat either.
28See also, Gillen, Snowberg, and Yariv (2019) who argue that the gender difference in tournament entry
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we included a risk-component in our non-competitive treatment by paying out the achieved
outcome with only a 50% chance. If risk-attitudes are a major component for performance
under competition, this design feature may explain why we do not find a difference between
men and women under competition.
An interesting and novel result is that when men are facing a stereotype threat against
them, they decrease both the number of attempts to solve problems as well as the accuracy
rate in solving problems they do try. The former effect is consistent with that a stereotype
threat reduces the effort men are willing to put into the task. The lower accuracy rate,
however, cannot be explained with lower effort. A possible explanation for it is ‘distracting
thoughts’, which have been shown to interfere with working memory and attention that are
fundamental for good performance of the multiplication task (e.g., Brewin & Smart, 2005).
Accordingly, the cause for men’s lower accuracy level under competitive incentives when
facing a stereotype threat is that they are distracted by the information they receive just
before the start of the competition that contradicts a stereotype they hold—namely, that
they are worse and not better than women at math.
This distracting thoughts explanation is consistent with the results in the other treat-
ments. They are unlikely to affect men’s performance in the implicit and explicit stereotype
treatment against women treatments or women’s performance in the explicit stereotype
against men treatment because in these treatments men and women, respectively, are not
the target of the stereotype threat. Women in the implicit and explicit stereotype against
women treatments are unlikely to be affected by distracting thoughts because the text they
read does not contradict the prior belief women hold about the invoked stereotype.
One might wonder whether an experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, 2010) has driven
the results regarding men’s underperformance when we induce a stereotype threat against
them. While we cannot fully exclude this possibility, we believe that it is unlikely to be a
main driving force. If the information we provide induced a strong experimenter demand
effect leading to worse performance, we would expect that this holds for men as well as for
women. However, in the explicit stereotype against women treatment there is no indication
for such an effect.
The findings of our study can have practical implications for policy design that copes with
stereotype threat, for instance at the workplace. A recommendation found in the stereotype
threat literature to prevent adverse effects of stereotype threat is the “stereotype nullifi-
cation”, i.e., to explicitly provide individuals with information that does not conform to the
identified by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) vanishes, when properly controlling for risk preferences.
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stereotype they hold (e.g., Smith & White, 2002). However, our results indicate that, at least
within a competitive context, no information about the stereotype should be provided at all.
If men and women are already competing against each other, they appear to cope well with
an eventual stereotype they hold in terms of performance. Our results suggest that pro-
viding information contradicting a stereotype seems to be irrelevant for the performance of
the a priori negatively stereotyped group, but could harm the performance of the a priori
positively stereotyped group.
Our paper contributes to the research aiming at understanding why women are un-
derrepresented in many high-status jobs and earn lower wages than men. When consid-
ering the pervasiveness of stereotype threat, our results indicate that women do not have
a weaker reaction to competitive pressure regarding performance when they have to com-
pete against men. Therefore, in contrast to previous conclusions in the literature, women’s
weaker attitude towards competition does not seem to be an explanation for observed gen-
der differences at the workplace if we consider the context in which men and women are
already competing. It would be an interesting avenue of future research to investigate if
our conclusions also hold for situations where men and women have to decide whether they
should compete or not (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007).
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